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Optimal Control of Prevention and Treatment
in a Basic Macroeconomic-Epidemiological Model
Davide La Torre∗ Tufail Malik† Simone Marsiglio‡
Abstract
We analyze the optimal control of disease prevention and treatment in a basic SIS model. We develop
a simple macroeconomic setup in which the social planner determines how to optimally intervene, through
income taxation, in order to minimize the social cost, inclusive of infection and economic costs, of the
spread of an epidemic disease. The disease lowers economic production and thus income by reducing the
size of the labor force employed in productive activities, tightening thus the economy’s overall resources
constraint. We consider a framework in which the planner uses the collected tax revenue to intervene in
either prevention (aimed at reducing the rate of infection) or treatment (aimed at increasing the speed
of recovery). Both optimal prevention and treatment policies allow the economy to achieve a disease-free
equilibrium in the long run but their associated costs are substantially different along the transitional
dynamic path. By quantifying the social costs associated with prevention and treatment we determine
which policy is most cost-effective under different circumstances, showing that prevention (treatment) is
desirable whenever the infectivity rate is low (high).
Keywords: SIS Model, Economic Policy, Prevention and Treatment
JEL Classification: C61, I10, I18
1 Introduction
Despite the recent improvements in hygiene, sanitation, vaccination, and access to treatment, infectious
diseases are still one of the most prevalent causes of morbidity and mortality in both developed and developing
countries (Lopez et al., 2006). While the severity and the transmission of infections are magnified by
the problems associated with malnutrition and poverty in developing economies (Gavazzi et al, 2004), in
industrialized countries they are amplified by the challenges related to population aging (Gavazzi and Krause,
2002). This explains why, other than the urgent need to support and encourage improvements in the
biomedical sector, policymakers in both the developed and the developing world are currently faced by the
pressing need to understand how to use public policy to reduce the social costs of epidemic diseases. In
particular, intervention programs may be broadly classified as either treatment or prevention, thus assessing
how such different programs may work and which may be most effective in specific situations is a critical
priority in the policymaking process. Following the seminal papers by Sanders (1971), Sethi (1974), Sethi
and Staats (1978), several works in the mathematical epidemiology literature have analyzed these issues from
different points of view (good surveys include Diekmann and Heesterbeek, 2000; and Hethcote, 2000, 2008).
The relevance of the topic from an economic point of view has recently given birth to a growing economic
epidemiology literature. Several works have tried to integrate the mathematical approaches in an economic
framework, by analyzing either the social planner’s welfare maximization or cost minimization problem;
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however, in all such attempts the economic setup proves to be overly simplified to preserve tractability,
often neglecting the macroeconomic consequences of infectious diseases (for recent surveys see Gersovitz
and Hammer, 2003; Klein et al., 2007; Philipson, 2000). Our goal in this paper is exactly to fill this gap
by developing a stylized but fully fledged macroeconomic-epidemiological model allowing to quantify and
evaluate the effectiveness of prevention and treatment strategies.
We analyze a susceptible-infected-susceptible (or SIS) model (Kermack and McKendrick, 1927), in which
individuals can be either infected or susceptible, but never become immune. Since in this framework in-
dividuals become susceptible again upon recovery, the disease tends to persist, suggesting thus that the
model is more suitable to describe an endemic rather than an epidemic disease (Hethcote, 2008). It can thus
characterize the diffusion of some bacterial agent diseases, like meningitis, plague and sexually transmitted
diseases, and some protozoan agent diseases, like malaria and sleeping sickness (Hethcote, 2008), which are
likely to affect human populations in both developed and developing countries. While the SIS framework
is well known in the mathematical epidemiology literature, in the economics literature only a few attempts
have been made to develop a framework able to integrate the SIS setup in an economic setting. Most of the
papers rely on a microeconomic perspective assuming that the budget or wealth available to policymakers
in order to contrast the spread of the disease is completely exogenous (Anderson et al, 2010; Gersovitz and
Hammer, 2004; Goldman and Lightwood, 2002; Rowthorn and Toxvard, 2012). Even if allowing to clearly
evaluate the impact of different policy measures on the disease dynamics, this approach does not permit to
take into account how the prevalence of the disease may affect the amount of resource available at macroe-
conomic level. In our setting the spread of the disease reduces the size of the healthy labor force (Goldman
and Bao, 2004; Papageorge, 2016), reducing in turn the income available in the economy to finance policy
interventions. The social planner thus needs to optimally determine the income tax rate in order to reduce
the spread of the disease, taking into account that the degree of infection endogenously determines the
tax revenue which is possible to collect for any given tax rate. Such an endogeneity of the public budget
constraint allows us to account for the mutual implications between macroeconomic conditions and health
expenditures, consistently with recent empirical evidence showing their positive association (Velenyi and
Smitz, 2014). The problem is therefore not trivial at all, but we show that it is possible to characterize,
even analytically, its optimal solution. Our results allow to assess from a macroeconomic point of view
the effectiveness of alternative policies, namely prevention and treatment, clearly identifying which policy
is most desirable in different circumstances. Few papers analyze the implications of infectious diseases on
macroeconomic outcomes (Goenka et al., 2012; Goenka and Liu, 2012), but none of them discuss the role of
public policy in reducing the prevalence of the disease.
Our approach in this paper consists of extending a basic mathematical epidemiology model to consider
the implications of optimal health policy in a stylized but fully fledged macroeconomic framework. To a
large extent it departs from some of the assumptions traditionally introduced in economic models, and
in particular from those related to rational behavior and the private sector’s behavior. We follow the
mathematical epidemiology literature to model the diffusion of the disease, and in particular in assuming that
the probability of transmission (conditional on exposure to an infected individual) is constant; the economic
epidemiology literature often relaxes this assumption by claiming that rational individuals may modify their
actions by implementing different forms of protective behavior (such as the choice of safer sex partners
in the case of sexually transmitted diseases), which are likely to reduce the probability of transmission
as the disease incidence increases (Philipson, 2000). Such a rational epidemics approach is well suited to
characterize specific diseases like HIV, for which individuals may react to the change in prevalence by avoiding
potential infectious contacts; however, it is less suited to characterize many bacterial or viral diseases, in
which infected individuals become infectious before the symptoms become visible, which largely reduces the
avoidance motive (Adda, 2016). We also follow the mathematical epidemiology literature in assuming that
the health intervention measures are entirely provided by the public sector, such that there is no need to
model the eventual interaction between public and private actions; the economic epidemiology literature
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discusses the possibility that publicly provided measures become completely ineffective because of responses
induced in the provision of private programs (Philipson, 2000). However, our approach departs also to some
extent from the traditional mathematical epidemiology literature in the definition of the objective function.
While most of the papers in the field consider a basic instantaneous loss function which depends only on the
direct (financial) costs of the implemented policy measure, by following the economic epidemiology literature
our instantaneous loss function reflects social costs depending on both the direct cost associated with the
policy instruments and the indirect cost associated with the spread of the infection (Philipson, 2000). Such
an approach, borrowing from both the mathematical epidemiology and economic epidemiology literatures,
allows us to analyze in the simplest possible framework to what extent publicly provided prevention and
treatment measures differ in determining the short and long run effects of infections diseases, along with their
implications on the social costs of epidemics and about the desirability of alternative eradication policies.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 recalls the traditional SIS epidemiology model briefly outlining
the role of prevention and treatment in our extended optimal control model. Section 3 introduces our
macroeconomic model, where the social planner tries to minimize the social costs of the endemic disease by
maintaining a balanced budget at any point in time. We then separately analyze the implications of optimal
prevention and optimal treatment comparing their effects on the dynamics and equilibrium outcomes of
susceptibles and infecteds. While in section 4 we focus on prevention which tends to directly reduce the
degree of disease incidence, in section 5 we focus on treatment which instead tends to directly increase
the speed of recovery from the disease. We show that both the policies can effectively be used to achieve
complete eradication of the disease in the long run equilibrium, however they substantially differ in their
associated short run economic costs. In order to account for this, we compare the social costs associated with
prevention and treatment in section 6, where we quantitatively assess their relative effectiveness identifying
which policy may be more cost-effective under different circumstances. We show that prevention is more
desirable whenever the infectivity rate is low, while treatment becomes the best option when the infectivity
rate is high. Finally, section 7 proposes concluding remarks and directions for future research.
2 The Baseline SIS Model
The susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) epidemiology model represents the simplest, and probably one of
the most widely known, form of mathematical epidemiology models. Such a type of model is suitable for
studying the transmission dynamics of infectious diseases which do not confer immunity; examples include
infections caused by bacteria, such as tuberculosis, or sexually transmitted diseases, such as gonorrhea
(Feng et al., 2005), seasonal influenza or other diseases which exhibit a seasonal pattern such as measles and
other childhood diseases exhibiting seasonal behavior such as mumps, rubella, chicken-pox and pertussis
(Martcheva, 2009). In its simplest setup, time is continuous and at each moment in time the overall
population, N ≡ 1, which is assumed to be constant and normalized to unity without loss of generality,
is composed by individuals who are either infected, It, or not infected but susceptible to infection, St.
At a given moment in time the flow of individuals between the two demographic statuses, infected and
susceptible, is determined by disease-specific conditions and number of interactions between the infecteds
and susceptibles. Specifically, on the one hand, infecteds spontaneously recover at the rate δ ≥ 0, meaning
that while the number of infecteds falls by δIt, at the same time the number of susceptibles increases by
δIt; on the other hand, susceptibles become infected by interacting with infecteds, and α ≥ 0 is the rate at
which such an eventual interaction leads to a new infection, suggesting that while the number of infecteds
rises by αStIt, at the same time the number of susceptibles falls by αStIt. Such flows between the two
states determine the evolution of the two stocks of infected and susceptible individuals, whose dynamics are
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summarized by the following planar system of differential equations:
S˙t = δIt − αStIt
I˙t = αStIt − δIt
(1)
The parameters α and δ totally characterize the evolution and the change in the population structure
due to the presence of an infectious disease, thus understanding what exactly these parameters represent is
essential to eventually design appropriate policies. Since α measures the degree of infectivity of the disease,
it represents the probability of infection for any susceptible individual. The parameter δ measures instead
the speed of decay of the infection, and thus 1δ represents the average length of infection. Public health
policies, as we shall see in a while, can modify the evolution of the population structure and eventually
reduce the proportion of infected individuals by affecting these two parameters. Note that the fact that the
population size is constant, implicitly assumes that the time scale of the disease is much faster than that
of births and deaths such that all demographic factors which could potentially modify the population size
can be safely ignored. This clearly implies that S˙t + I˙t = 0 suggesting that 1 = St + It is the constant total
population at any time t. Given the initial size of infecteds and susceptibles, I0 ≥ and S0 ≥ 0, respectively,
such that S0 + I0 = 1, (1) completely characterizes the evolution of St and It. The simplicity of the above
equations makes the model extremely intuitive and fully tractable, allowing also to obtain explicit analytical
solutions characterizing the entire dynamic path of the variables.
The main goal of epidemiology models consists of understanding the effectiveness of different policies in
order to reduce and eventually eradicate the disease. In order to formally look at this, disease intervention
strategies are incorporated in the basic model (1), mainly in the form of additional state variables which
tend to increase the dimension of the dynamic system leading often to the lack of explicit analytical results.
For example Alexander et al. (2004) and Qiu and Feng (2010) construct and analyze vaccination models
of influenza developing a SVIRS (Susceptible-Vaccinated-Infected-Recovered-Susceptible) model where the
latter also incorporate antiviral treatment and include drug-sensitive and drug-resistant strain types. In
order to keep the analysis as simple as possible and obtain a benchmark framework to compare our follow-
ing optimal control results with, we now consider disease intervention strategies as exogenous parameters.
Specifically, we denote the prevention (or prophylactic intervention) rate with 0 < p < 1 and the treatment
(or therapeutic intervention) rate with 0 < v < 1. Prevention tends to reduce the probability of infection
to α(1 − p), while treatment tends to increase the speed of recovery from infection to δ(1 + v). Thus, the
dynamic system (1) extended for prevention and treatment reads as follows:
S˙t = δ(1 + v)It − α(1− p)StIt
I˙t = α(1 − p)StIt − δ(1 + v)It.
(2)
In the equations (2), the terms (1 − p)St and (1 + v)It represent the share of susceptibles (i.e., potential
newly infected individuals) exposed to the prevention policy and the share of infected individuals exposed
to the treatment policy, respectively. Therefore, prevention acts on the “disease incidence” which represents
the flow of newly infected individuals, αStIt, while treatment on the “disease prevalence” which represents
the stock of infected individuals, δIt. Specifically, prevention tends to reduce the disease incidence while
treatment tends to decrease the disease prevalence. Note the asymmetric effect of prevention and treatment:
while prevention (at level pt = 1) may completely prevent infection, treatment (at level vt = 1) can only
increase recovery to a finite rate. This difference is clearly due to the fact that while prevention acts on
disease incidence and as such it can prevent susceptible individuals to ever become infected, treatment
acts on disease prevalence and as such it cannot prevent new infections to eventually occur. The model’s
parameters along with their interpretation are summarized in Table 1.
Since the total population size is constant, by exploiting the fact that St = 1− It it is possible to recast
the above system (2) in terms of the following single differential equation describing the evolution of infected
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Parameter Description
α rate of infection
δ rate of recovery
p prevention rate (prophylactic intervention)
v treatment rate (therapeutic intervention)
Table 1: Model parameters.
individuals:
I˙t = α(1 − p)(1− It)It − δ(1 + v)It. (3)
Assuming constant prevention and treatment rates, analyzing the dynamics of (3) is straightforward. As
extensively discussed in the mathematical epidemiology literature, its outcome crucially depends on the
“basic reproduction number” (Hethcote, 2000), R0, given by:
R0 = α(1 − p)
δ(1 + v)
. (4)
The basic reproduction number R0 measures the average number of secondary infections produced by a
typical infectious individual (over the course of his infectious period) introduced into a completely susceptible
population. The magnitude of such a parameter identifies a threshold value determining which specific
equilibrium the number of infecteds will tend to converge to over the long run. Indeed, it is straightforward
to show that (3) admits two equilibria:
I1 = 0, (5)
I2 = 1− 1R0 =
α(1− p)− δ(1 + v)
α(1 − p) . (6)
The former represents the disease-free equilibrium in which the population will be composed only by sus-
ceptibles (S1 = 1), while the latter the endemic equilibrium in which the total population will be composed
by both infected (I2) and susceptible (S2 = 1− I2) individuals. According to the size of parameter values,
and in particular according to the size of R0, two scenarios can alternatively occur. (i) If R0 ≤ 1, (3) can
be written as I˙t = δ(R0− 1− αδ It)It, clearly showing that I˙t < 0. Thus, in such a case, only the disease-free
equilibrium exists which, by being asymptotically stable, will be naturally achieved over the long run (see
Figure 1, left panel). (ii) If instead R0 > 1, (3) can be rewritten as I˙t = δR0N (I2− It)It, showing that in this
case the endemic equilibrium does exist and this is exactly the equilibrium which will be achieved over the
long run, as long as I0 > 0. Indeed, I˙t > 0 whenever 0 < I0 < I2 and I˙t < 0 whenever I0 > I2, suggesting
that the disease-free equilibrium is unstable, while the endemic equilibrium is asymptotically stable (Figure
1, right panel). In both the cases one equilibrium, either the disease-free or the endemic equilibrium, will
be achieved regardless of the initial size of the infected subpopulation.
• ✛
I1
R0 ≤ 1
0 N • •✲ ✛
I1 I2
R0 > 1
0 N
Figure 1: Equilibria in the baseline SIS model and their stability properties.
Such results suggest that the value and the determinants of R0 are crucial to understand which specific
outcome will be achieved over the long run: if R0 ≤ 1 the disease-free equilibrium will be achieved, while
if R0 > 1 the endemic equilibrium will be attained. This is driven by the fact that R0 measures the
relative intensity of the effective recovery rate (inclusive of treatment), δ(1 + v), and the effective infection
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rate (inclusive of prevention). Specifically, if R0 ≤ 1 the effective recovery rate is faster than the effective
infection rate, and thus a complete elimination of the disease in the long run will be possible; if R0 > 1,
instead, the effective recovery rate is slower than the effective infection rate, and thus in the long run the
disease will persist at a strictly positive level. Since the size of R0 depends on both disease-specific and
public-policy parameters, health policy can be effectively used in order to reduce R0. In particular, thanks
to either treatment or prevention or both, health policy could be effectively implemented to lower R0 enough
in order to eventually achieve the disease-free equilibrium.
Another way to look at the model’s possible outcomes consists of noticing that (3) is a Bernoulli differ-
ential equation, which can thus be solved in closed form to obtain the explicit time evolution of the number
of infecteds, It:
It =


eα(1−1/R0)t
1
1−1/R0
(eα(1−1/R0)t−1)+1/I0 , R0 6= 1,
1
αt+1/I0
, R0 = 1.
(7)
From the above expression, it is clear that, independently of the value of I0, what determines which specific
value It will converge to over the long run is simply determined by the size of R0.
Our discussion about the possible outcomes in the baseline SIS model, along with the role of public policy,
can be summarized in the following proposition, which represents a well-known result in the mathematical
epidemiology literature.
Proposition 1. As t→∞, the number of infecteds in the baseline SIS model, summarized by (3), approaches
the disease-free equilibrium I1 provided that R0 ≤ 1, while it approaches the endemic equilibrium I2 provided
that R0 > 1. Public policy, in the form of either treatment or prevention or a combination of them, by
affecting R0 can effectively be used to achieve complete eradication of the disease.
Proposition 1 implies that the disease can be effectively eliminated from the population if the basic
reproduction number, R0, can be brought to (and maintained at) a value less than unity, and public policy
in this context can play a fundamental role.
Thus far, health policy has been treated as a mere parameter which is clearly an oversimplification of
how public policy effectively works; in order to look at how optimal policymaking may affect and depend
on the evolution and spread of the disease we now turn to an extension of the model aimed at endogenizing
public policy. We do so by considering an optimal control problem in which prevention and treatment
are determined by taking into account the availability of resources to finance health policy, and such an
availability of resources is endogenously determined at the macroeconomic level. Different from all extant
works, which consider the budget (or wealth) available to finance health measures as exogenously given
(Anderson et al., 2010; Gersovitz and Hammer, 2004; Goldman and Lightwood, 2002), we instead assume
that this depends on the tax revenue, which by being proportional to income, depends endogenously on
the spread of the disease determining how many individuals in the population are effectively available to
work. This approach is consistent with recent empirical evidence showing that health expenditure is to
a large extent procyclical, especially in developing countries but also in developed countries when facing
severe downturns like the recent global financial crisis (Velenyi and Smitz, 2014). Taking into account the
endogeneity of the budget constraint allows thus to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the role
of optimal health policies in determining both economic and health performance.
3 The Optimal Control Model
We now endogenize health policy by considering an optimal control model in which policymakers determine
the extent of intervention through either prevention or treatment in order to minimize the social costs
associated with the spread of a certain disease. The population N ≡ 1 is assumed to be constant and
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normalized to unity as in the baseline SIS model, and to be composed by infected, It, and healthy but
susceptible, St, individuals: N = St + It. The evolution of the stock of susceptibles and infecteds is exactly
as discussed in the previous section according to our baseline SIS model.
The unique final consumption good, Yt, is produced competitively by firms employing (healthy) individ-
uals, according to the linear production technology Yt = St, in which for further simplicity each susceptible
produces one unit of output, suggesting thus that infected individuals may represent a burden for the society
since they cannot contribute to productive activities. For the sake of simplicity we abstract from capital
accumulation, and thus all agents at each moment in time completely consume their disposable income1:
Ct = (1− τt)Yt, where Ct denotes consumption, Yt income and τt ∈ (0, 1) the tax rate.
The tax revenue is used to control the spread of the infectious disease, such that an increase in τ reduces
infections but at the same time lowers current consumption possibilities, identifying a clear trade-off between
economic and health performance. Specifically, the tax revenue, τtYt, is allocated in order to maintain a
balanced budget at any point in time between prevention spending, ptSt, and treatment spending, vtIt, as
τtYt = Stpt + Itvt, where 0 ≤ pt ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ vt ≤ 1 denote prevention and treatment activities respectively.
Without loss of generality, we assume that each unit of income spent in either prevention or treatment affects
one-for-one the targeted subpopulation, such that the dynamics of susceptibles and infecteds is exactly as
in (2). The social planner wishes to minimize the social cost of epidemics by choosing the optimal level of
the policy instruments, pt and vt.
The social cost function, C, is the infinite discounted (ρ > 0 is the rate of time preference) sum of
instantaneous losses generated by infections and public policy; the instantaneous loss function takes into
account both the infection cost associated with reductions in production (It) and the economic cost generated
by reductions in current consumption (pt and vt). For the sake of simplicity, the instantaneous loss function
is assumed to be increasing and convex in each of its arguments and as in La Torre et al. (2017), to take
the quadratic form ℓ(It, pt, vt) =
I2t (1+pt+vt)
2
2 , penalizing thus deviations from the no-infections scenario (i.e.,
It = 0) and the strength of the policy instruments (pt and vt). In such a specification, the infection and
economic costs take a multiplicative form, while the different types of economic costs appear additively.
The social planner needs to choose pt and vt in order to minimize the social cost function, given the
evolution of infecteds and susceptibles and the initial size of the two subpopulations2. The planner’s opti-
mization problem can be represented as an optimal control problem in two state and two control variables,
as follows:
min
pt,vt
C =
∫ ∞
0
I2t (1 + pt + vt)
2
2
e−ρtdt
s.t. S˙t = δ(1 + vt)It − α(1− pt)StIt,
I˙t = α(1− pt)StIt − δ(1 + vt)It,
S0, I0 > 0 given.
(8)
As before, by exploiting the fact that the population size is constant 1 = St + It, the model above boils
1Since we rely on a representative agent framework, our model’s formulation implicitly assumes that total income in the
economy, generated by labor activities of healthy workers, is evenly spread across the entire population, meaning that the
disposable income of susceptible and infected individuals is on average the same. This may be due to the effects of redistribution
policies, in the form of lump sum taxes levied on susceptibles and lump sum transfers granted to infecteds. For the sake of
simplicity such redistribution policies are not modeled in our framework.
2Clearly, our formulation is a bit simiplistic since implying that the social planner has only one role related to reducing the
cost of the disease. In a more realistic setup we should take into account that the planner may also engage in other activities
which could partly affect the availability of resources; for example the planner may be subsidizing education which would affect
income and thus the budget constraint. Since considering these issues would lead us to depart substantially from our main
research question, it seems convenient to keep the model as simple and focused as possible.
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down to the following optimization problem in two controls and one state variable only:
min
pt,vt
C =
∫ ∞
0
(1− St)2(1 + pt + vt)2
2
e−ρtdt
s.t. S˙t = δ(1 + vt)(1− St)− α(1− pt)St(1− St),
S0 > 0 given.
(9)
In order to maintain the analysis as simple as possible we analyze separately the prevention and treatment
cases, that is we first set vt ≡ 0 and then pt ≡ 0. This allows us to analytically characterize and compare
the effects of either prevention or treatment measures on both the economic and health performance of our
model economy, by relying on a common control variable represented by the tax rate.
4 Prevention
We analyze first the effects of prevention (vt ≡ 0). In such a framework the budget balance constraint
simplifies to τtYt = Stpt, and the model can be equivalently rewritten as:
min
τt
C =
∫ ∞
0
(1− St)2(1 + τt)2
2
e−ρtdt
s.t. S˙t = δ(1 − St)− α(1 − τt)St(1− St)
(10)
in which the tax rate τt represents the new control variable. The Hamiltonian function, H(τt, St, λt), where
λt denotes the costate variable, reads as follows:
H(τt, St, λt) = (1− St)
2(1 + τt)
2
2
e−ρt + λt [δ(1 − St)− α(1− τt)St(1− St)] .
First order necessary conditions yield the following planar system of differential equations:
τ˙t
1 + τt
= ρ− 2αSt + δ − α(1 − τt)St + δ 1
St
S˙t = δ(1 − St)− α(1− τt)St(1− St)
(11)
Despite the fact that Hamiltonian function is non-convex and thus traditional Mangasarian second order
conditions are not verified, it is possible to show that the above first order conditions are also sufficient.
This is due to the fact that the optimal control is unique along with the fact that the state and costate
equations are bounded, meaning that the above system of differential equations has a Lipschitz structure
(Jung et al., 2002). These specific properties of the model ensure that the solution that we are able to
characterize by analyzing the system of first order conditions is effectively the unique optimal solution of
our minimization problem. With the exception of Goenka et al. (2012) which however abstracts completely
from health policy, to the best of our knowledge none of the existing comparable economic-epidemiology
models based on SIS dynamics is able to prove sufficiency of their first order conditions, and thus they need
to rely on some guess or numerical approach to try to overcome the issue (Goldman and Lightwood, 2002;
Gersovitz and Hammer, 2004).
It is straightforward to show that the above system (11) admits two equilibria E1 = (S1, τ 1) and E2 =
(S2, τ 2) where:
S1 = 1, τ1 =
3α− 2δ − ρ
α
;
S2 =
2δ√
ρ2 + 8αδ − ρ
, τ2 =
2α− (
√
ρ2 + 8αδ − ρ)
2α
.
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Note that E1 is well defined provided that 2α < 2δ+ ρ < 3α, while E2 exists whenever 1 > max{ 2δα+ρ , δ+ρ2α };
we proceed in our following analysis by assuming that these conditions are simultaneously met. The stability
properties of the two equilibria can be analyzed via linearization. Linearization around steady state yields
the following Jacobian matrix for the first equilibrium:
J(S1, τ1) =
[
ρ− 2α(1 − τ1) + 2δ (1 + τ1)[−2α− α(1 − τ1)− δ
0 −δ − α(1− τ1)
]
;
its eigenvalues are ϑ1 = 4α − ρ − 2δ > 0 and ϑ2 = −[δ + α(1 − τ1)] < 0, meaning that the equilibrium
E1 = (S1, τ1) is saddle point stable. The Jacobian matrix for the second equilibrium is:
J(S2, τ 2) =

 ρ+ δ 1−S2S2 (1 + τ2)[−2α − δ 1+S2S22 ]
αS2(1− S2) −δ 1−S2S2

 ;
its eigenvalues are ϑ1 =
ρ+
√
ε
2 , and ϑ2 =
ρ−√e
2 , where ε = ρ
2 + 4
√
8αδ + ρ2
[√
8αδ + ρ2 − (2α + δ)
]
. Since
their sum is positive, trace(J(S2, τ2)) = ρ > 0, and their product is positive as well, det(J(S2, τ2)) =√
8αδ + ρ2
[
2α+ δ −
√
8αδ + ρ2
]
> 0, the equilibrium E2 = (S2, τ 2) is unstable. These results suggest that
independently of the initial spread of the infectious disease, the economy, thanks to its optimal disease control
policy, will be able to achieve the equilibrium E1 = (S1, τ 1) in the long run, characterized by a disease-
free equilibrium situation. Since the control policy involves prevention, also in the long run disease-free
equilibrium a positive level of intervention is needed in order to maintain the effectiveness of the preventive
measure, suggesting that intuitively prevention methods need to be actually implemented both in the short
run and in the long run.
 
 
τ⋅ = 0
S⋅ = 0
S⋅ = 0
E1
E2
St10
τt
Figure 2: Phase diagram in the prevention case; the stable manifold is represented by the dashed line.
The phase diagram of the system (11) is shown in Figure 2, which shows the two S˙ = 0 loci (the vertical
line and the less steep nonlinear curve) and the τ˙ = 0 locus (the steeper nonlinear curve); the two intersections
between these loci represent the equilibria E1 and E2. Figure 2 highlights the saddle point stability property
of the equilibrium E1: given the initial level of susceptibles S0, since the stable manifold is unique there
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exists also a unique choice of the policy instrument τ0 ensuring convergence to the equilibrium. This means
that the optimal prevention policy is uniquely determined and as shown in the figure it is monotonically
increasing (note that both components of the eigenvector
[
ϑ1−ϑ2, (1+τ1)[2α+α(1−τ 1)+δ]
]′
corresponding
to the negative eigenvalue ϑ2 of the boundary equilibrium E1 are positive so that τ0 < τ¯1 for every initial
point on the branch of the stable manifold inside the feasible region). This means that over time a larger
tax rate is needed to achieve the long run equilibrium characterized by a disease-free status. We summarize
these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Optimal prevention policy allows the disease-free equilibrium to be achieved. The policy
tool (i.e., the tax rate) is rising during the transition to the long run equilibrium in which it stabilizes at a
strictly positive level.
Proposition 2 is consistent with the findings in section 2, showing that prevention policy may be an
effective strategy to completely eradicate the disease over the long run (Proposition 1). However the op-
timal design of prevention measures requires the health policy instrument not to be constant over time,
as simplistically assumed earlier, but to actually increase over time to achieve a constant strictly positive
level in the long run. This implies that the prevention policy and epidemic dynamics over time affect the
instantaneous loss function in opposite directions (see the formulation of the loss function in (10)): while the
infection cost falls during the transition the economic cost tends to rise, suggesting that the instantaneous
loss might get larger and larger over time (if the economic cost exceeds the infection cost) and thus the
overall social cost might be substantially large.
Different from what shown in the economic epidemiology literature (Gersovitz and Hammer, 2004; Gold-
man and Lightwood, 2002; Rowthorn and Toxvard, 2012) in which it is optimal to achieve the endemic-
equilibrium and thus for the disease to persist even in the long run, Proposition 2 states that in our setting
the economy will converge to the disease-free equilibrium such that complete eradication will occur. The
reason why our results differ from those found in extant literature lies in the role of the feedback effects
between health and income: since the social planner accounts for the fact that the current level of disease
prevalence reduces income, which in turn lowers the amount of resources available to reduce prevalence in
the future, he finds it optimal to devote to health policy enough resources to bring the basic reproduction
number below unity. During the transition to the disease-free equilibrium the tax rate increases since pre-
vention acts on the susceptibles, whose number increases over time: in order to expose a larger number of
susceptibles to prevention measures, a larger amount of resources (a higher tax rate) is needed.
5 Treatment
We now analyze the effects of treatment, that is we set pt ≡ 0. In such a framework the budget balance
constraint becomes τtYt = Itvt, and the model can be equivalently rewritten as:
min
τt
C =
∫ ∞
0
(1− St)2
(
1 + τtSt1−St
)2
2
e−ρtdt
s.t. S˙t = δ
(
1 +
τtSt
1− St
)
(1− St)− αSt(1− St).
(12)
After some simple algebra and by using the substitution φt = 1− St + τtSt where φt ≥ 0, the above model
boils down to:
min
φt
C =
∫ ∞
0
φ2t
2
e−ρtdt
s.t. S˙t = δφt − αSt(1− St).
(13)
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In this case the Hamiltonian function, H(φt, St, λt), reads as follows:
H(φt, St, λt) = φ
2
t
2
e−ρt + λt [δφt − αSt(1− St)] .
First order necessary conditions lead to the following planar system of differential equations:
φ˙t
φt
= ρ+ α(1− 2St),
S˙t = δφt − αSt(1− St).
(14)
By applying the same argument discussed for the prevention model earlier, it is possible to conclude that
first order conditions are also sufficient and thus characterize the unique optimal solution of the control
problem. The system (14) admits two equilibria E1 = (S1, φ1) and E2 = (S2, φ2) where:
S1 = 1, φ1 = 0;
S2 =
ρ+ α
2α
, φ2 =
(α− ρ)(α+ ρ)
4αδ
.
Note that E2 is well defined provided that α > ρ, which we assume to hold true in what follows. As in
the previous section, in order to assess the stability properties of the system we proceed via linearization.
Linearization around steady state yields the following Jacobian matrix for the first equilibrium:
J(S1, φ1) =
[
ρ− α 0
δ 2α
]
;
its eigenvalues are ϑ1 = ρ − α < 0 and ϑ2 = 2α > 0, meaning that the equilibrium E1 = (S1, φ1) is saddle
point stable. The Jacobian matrix for the second equilibrium is:
J(S2, φ2) =
[
0 −2αφ2
δ ρ
]
;
its eigenvalues are ϑ1 =
ρ+
√
ρ2−16αδφ2
2 > 0 and ϑ2 =
ρ+
√
ρ2−16αδφ2
2 > 0, meaning that E2 = (S2, φ2) is
unstable. By rewriting the above system of differential equations in terms of the variables τt and St, we get
the following expression of the equilibrium E1 = (S1, τ 1) and E2 = (S2, τ2)
S1 = 1, τ1 = 0;
S2 =
ρ+ α
2α
, τ2 =
(α− ρ)(α + ρ− 2δ)
2δ(ρ+ α)
.
The condition 1 > max{ ρα , 2δα } ensures that the equilibria are well defined also in terms of the variables τt
and St, since it implies that also τ2 is positive and smaller than unity. Note also that the diffeomorphism
τ → φ = 1− S + τS is well defined around both the equilibria and this guarantees that the two systems are
smoothly equivalent. This allows us to conclude that E1 = (S1, τ 1) is saddle point stable while E2 = (S2, τ 2)
is unstable. These results suggest that, as in the previous section, independently of the initial spread of
the infectious disease, the economy, thanks to its optimal disease control policy, will be able to achieve
in the long run the equilibrium E1 = (S1, τ 1) characterized by a disease-free equilibrium situation. Since
the control policy involves treatment, in the long run disease-free equilibrium a zero level of intervention is
needed, meaning that intuitively treatment methods need to be implemented only in the short run.
The phase diagram of the system (14) is shown in Figure 3, which shows the two φ˙ = 0 loci (the vertical
line and the horizontal axis) and the S˙ = 0 locus (the bell-shaped curve); the two intersections between
these loci represent the equilibria E1 and E2. Also in this case Figure 3 highlights the saddle point stability
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Figure 3: Phase diagram in the treatment case; the stable manifold is represented by the dashed line.
property of the equilibrium E1: given the initial level of susceptibles S0, since the stable manifold is unique
there exists also a unique choice of the variable φ0 and thus of the policy instrument τ0 ensuring convergence
to the equilibrium. This means that the optimal treatment policy is uniquely determined and as shown
in the figure it is monotonically decreasing (note that the components of the eigenvector corresponding to
the negative eigenvalue ϑ1 of E1, given by [ϑ1 − ϑ2, δ]′, have opposite signs, so φ0 > φ¯1 for every initial
point on the branch of the stable manifold that lies inside the feasible region; since ∂τ∂φ > 0, the path of
τ is decreasing as well). This implies that over time a smaller tax rate is needed to achieve the long run
equilibrium characterized by a disease-free status.
Proposition 3. Optimal treatment policy allows the disease-free equilibrium to be achieved. The policy tool
(i.e., the tax rate) is falling during the transition to the long run equilibrium in which it stabilizes at a zero
level.
As discussed earlier for prevention, Proposition 3 is also consistent with the findings in section 2, showing
the treatment policy may be an effective strategy to completely eradicate the disease over the long run
(Proposition 1). However the optimal design of treatment measures requires the health policy instrument
not to be constant over time, as assumed earlier, but actually to initially exceed its long run level in order to
decrease over time and achieve a constant zero level in the long run. If this is the case, the treatment policy
and epidemic dynamics over time undoubtedly affect the instantaneous loss function in the same direction
(see the loss function in (12)), since both the infection cost and the economic cost fall during the transition;
this suggests that the instantaneous loss will get smaller and smaller over time and thus the size of the
overall social cost mainly depends on the initial (infection and economic) cost.
Exactly as discussed in the case of prevention, our results in Proposition 3 differ from those typically
discussed in the economic epidemiology literature, because the social planner by effectively accounting for the
health-income feedback effects finds it optimal to bring the basic reproduction number below unity allowing
the economy to converge to the disease-free equilibrium. Different from what seen in the prevention case,
during the transition to the disease-free equilibrium the tax rate decreases since treatment acts on the
infecteds, whose number decreases over time: in order to expose a smaller number of infecteds to treatment
measures, a smaller amount of resources (a lower tax rate) is needed.
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6 Prevention vs Treatment
From our analysis of prevention and treatment policies, it is clear that from a qualitative point of view their
effects are similar but their quantitative implications may be substantially different. In fact, if it is true
that both prevention and treatment allow a disease-free equilibrium to be achieved in the long run, but the
level of the policy instrument required to achieve this differs both in the short and in the long run under
prevention and treatment; with prevention the tax rate tends to increase over time to achieve in the long
run a strictly positive level, while with treatment the tax rates achieves a zero level in the long run and in
the short run it exceeds this level to gradually decrease over time; this implies that the economic costs of
prevention and treatment, and thus the social costs as well, may be quantitatively very different. In order
to shed some light on this, we now compare the prevention and treatment outcomes in order to quantify
which of the two policy options is able to achieve eradication at the lower social cost. In order to do so, we
propose some numerical simulations based on some parametrizations consistent with the technical conditions
required for the disease-free equilibrium to be well-defined, and by changing some parameter values we assess
which policy is most cost-effective under different circumstances.
In order to compute the exact value of the social cost, C, we need first to derive the optimal dynamic
path of the tax rate τ ; since under both prevention and treatment the disease-free equilibrium is saddle-
point stable, there exists a unique initial value of the tax rate allowing to achieve convergence to such an
equilibrium. Thus, from a computational point of view deriving the optimal trajectory of τ and S is not
simple, but the problem can be overcome by relying on either a time-elimination approach or a shooting
method (Mullingan and Sala–i–Martin, 1993). We use this latter approach to identify the correct initial
value of the tax rate, τ0, which can then be used to simulate the dynamics of τ and S, under prevention and
treatment, and to finally assess the integral in (10) and (12). In our analysis, we assume that I0 = 0.04, that is
the initial share of infected population is 4%, implying that share of susceptible population is 96%, S0 = 0.96;
we also assume the rate of time preference, ρ, to equal 0.04, consistently with the macroeconomic literature
(Mullingan and Sala–i–Martin, 1993); we set the final time horizon large enough in order to approximate the
infinite planning horizon in our analysis, and in particular we set T = 400. The value of the infectivity rate,
α, and the recovery rate, δ, are instead changed in order to understand how our results may change with
different disease-specific parameters: specifically, in order to mimic different infection-recovery scenarios the
values for α are firstly varied and then the corresponding values of δ ∈ (α − ρ2 , 1.5α − ρ2 ) which ensure the
existence of the disease-free equilibrium are determined.
The outcome of our numerical analysis is summarized in Table 2, where we report the initial and final
value or the policy instrument along with the computed social cost, for both the prevention and treatment
cases, for a relevant subset of considered parametrizations. We can note that the results confirm what
discussed in our previous analysis from sections 4 and 5: in the case of prevention the initial value of the
policy instrument is smaller than the final value suggesting that its value increases over time; in the case of
treatment the opposite is true and the policy instrument initially exceeds its final value suggesting that its
value decreases over time. However, differently from our previous analysis, our numerical results allow to
compare the social costs under the two alternative health policies, and we can see that a unique dominant
strategy (in bold in the table) does not exist. Specifically, when the infectivity rate is low, prevention is
most cost-effective when recovery is slower than infectivity, δ < α, while as soon as the speed of recovery
equals or exceeds that of infectivity, δ ≥ α, treatment becomes the best choice; when the infectivity rate is
high, instead, treatment is always more cost-effective than prevention.
The above analysis suggests that understanding a priori which policy is most suited to achieve disease
eradication at the lowest possible cost is not trivial. Indeed, given the specific features, in terms of infectivity
and recovery rates, of different diseases, in some cases it may be convenient to rely on prevention while in
others on treatment. Specifically, note that the most interesting situation for our analysis is represented
by the case δ < α, since in such a framework the basic reproduction number in absence of public policy is
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Prevention Treatment
α δ τ0 τ¯1 C τ0 τ¯1 C
0.2 0.185 0.8643 0.950 0.0077 0.0357 0 0.0081
0.2 0.2 0.7074 0.800 0.0071 0.0299 0 0.0070
0.2 0.26 0.0783 0.200 0.0046 0.0134 0 0.0041
0.3 0.281 0.9096 0.993 0.0053 0.0377 0 0.0055
0.3 0.3 0.7774 0.867 0.0049 0.07139 0 0.0048
0.3 0.4 0.0801 0.200 0.0031 0.0535 0 0.0027
0.4 0.381 0.9114 0.995 0.0040 0.0379 0 0.0041
0.4 0.4 0.8123 0.900 0.0038 0.0727 0 0.0037
0.4 0.5 0.2902 0.400 0.0027 0.0582 0 0.0024
0.5 0.485 0.8958 0.980 0.0031 0.0758 0 0.0032
0.5 0.5 0.8333 0.920 0.002976387 0.0736 0 0.002975999
0.5 0.6 0.416 0.520 0.0023 0.06129 0 0.0021
0.6 0.585 0.8993 0.983 0.00261 0.0760 0 0.00263
0.6 0.6 0.8471 0.933 0.0026 0.0355 0 0.0025
0.6 0.8 0.1515 0.267 0.0016 0.0162 0 0.0014
Table 2: Social cost associated with prevention and treatment.
higher than unity (see equation (4)) and thus public policy is effectively needed to achieve eradication3; if
this is the case, prevention is more desirable when the degree of infectivity is low while treatment becomes
more desirable as soon the degree of infectivity is high enough. This can be explained as follows: when
the infectivity rate is low, prevention is more beneficial than treatment since, by reducing the number of
new infections with a relatively low level of the policy tool, it gives rise to low economic and health costs;
when the infectivity rate is high, prevention is not effective enough in reducing new infections and thus
treatment becomes more beneficial. These results highlight that the choice of the best policy option requires
policymakers to clearly assess the magnitude of the infectivity rate, which plays a critical role in determining
which policy may allow to ensure eradication in the long run in the most cost-effective way.
Specific examples of diseases characterized by high infectivity are mumps, rubella, tuberculosis, chick-
enpox, pertussis, measles (since they can be spread through sneezing, coughing and even talking); sexually
transmitted diseases, like gonorrhea, which can only be transmitted through physical sexual contact or
vertically from mother to baby, are instead characterized by relatively low infectivity. Our quantitative
assessment of the social cost of public health policies suggests that while for the former set of diseases
treatment may be the most cost-effective strategy, for the latter prevention may be best.
To the best of our knowledge, no other study has thus far been able to compare prevention and treatment
in a way comparable to ours. Some works have analyzed the joint effects of prevention and treatment on
health outcomes, but they have done so without trying to quantify their welfare effects (Gersovitz and
Hammer, 2004; Rowthorn and Toxvard, 2012). Several works have tried to quantify from an econometric
point of view the effects of alternative disease control policies but they have mainly focused on specific
diseases, notably HIV, in specific countries (Goldman and Bao, 2004; Lakdawalla et al., 2006; Papageorge,
2016). Even if based on a stylized setup, our theoretical approach allows us to understand how to effectively
rely on public health policies in order to control a number of diseases. We thus believe it can be used as a
benchmark framework to assess the effectiveness of alternative policies, accounting for their short and long
3Whenever δ ≥ α, the basic reproduction number in absence of public policy is lower than unity and thus a disease-free
equilibrium is meant to be achieved independently of public intervention. In this case, public policy aims only to increase the
speed of convergence to the disease-free equilibrium, but we did not rule this case out of our analysis since in certain situations
even increasing the speed of convergence to a disease-free situation may be desirable.
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run implications on both health and economic outcomes.
7 Conclusion
Infectious diseases remain an important source of morbidity and mortality both in developed and developing
countries, thus understanding how to intervene with specific health policies in order to minimize the social
costs induced by such diseases is an important problem for policymakers. In this paper we develop a
simple macroeconomic model to take into account the mutual feedback between the spread of diseases and
economic activities in a standard SIS model in order to compare the effects of prevention and treatment
measures. Our approach differs both from extant mathematical epidemiology and economic epidemiology
studies, since we consider a macroeconomic setup allowing for mutual feedback effects between the disease
prevalence and income that has never been taken into account thus far. We show that both prevention and
treatment policies can be used in order to achieve complete eradication in the long run; however despite
their qualitative effects are similar, their quantitative implications are substantially different. By comparing
the costs associated with prevention and treatment we can show that, in the most interesting case in which
δ < α, if the infectivity rate is low prevention allows to achieve a disease-free equilibrium at the lowest social
cost, while if the infectivity rate is high treatment is more desirable.
To the best of our knowledge this paper represents the first attempt to analyze from a macroeconomic
point of view the implications of prevention and treatment policies in a basic epidemiological model. There-
fore, our modeling framework has been quite simplistic in order to understand in the most intuitive way
the effects of health-income feedback at macroeconomic level. This however has come to a cost and some
of the modelling assumptions might need to be relaxed in order to develop a more realistic analysis of the
macroeconomic implications of alternative health policies. For example, by relying on what discussed in the
economic epidemiology literature we should take into account the effects of treatment and prevention not
only in isolation but also in conjunction (Gersovitz and Hammer, 2004; Rowthorn and Toxvard, 2012); or
by relying on what discussed in the mathematical epidemiology literature we should analyze the effects of
alternative policies, like vaccination, by introducing some additional equation in our setup (Alexander et al.,
2004). The analysis of these further challenging issues are left for future research.
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